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Abstract
A significant security vulnerability in a recently published group
key establishment protocol is described. This vulnerability allows a
malicious insider to fraudulently establish a group key with an inno-
cent victim, with the key chosen by the attacker. This shortcoming is
sufficiently serious that the protocol should not be used.
1 Introduction
Hsu, Harn, Mu, Zhang and Zhu [3] recently published a protocol (which
for convenience we refer to as the HHMZZ protocol) designed to provide
authenticated group key establishment in a wireless network (although there
are no obvious wireless-specific aspects of the protocol). In this brief note
we describe a serious security issue with this scheme; in particular it does
not provide the properties claimed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out
the protocol, including the intended context of use. Section 3 then describes
a serious security vulnerability in the protocol. The paper concludes in
section 4.
2 The Hsu-Harn-Mu-Zhang-Zhu protocol
2.1 Context and goals
The HHMZZ protocol is intended for use by a pre-established collection of
users, and enables any subset (group) of this community to be equipped
with a shared secret key by a trusted Key Generation Centre (KGC). Such
protocols have been widely discussed in the literature — see, for example,
chapter 6 of Boyd and Mathuria [1]. The area is sufficiently well-established
that an ISO/IEC standard for group key establishment [4] was published in
2011.
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The threat model for such protocols varies, but typically the goal is
that, after completion of the protocol, all participants agree on the same
key, they know it is ‘fresh’, and that no parties other than those intended
learn anything about the key. The authors of the HHMZZ protocol are a
little vague as to the assumed capabilities of attackers, although they do refer
to both insider and outsider attackers ([3], section 4). It is thus legitimate
to assume that the claimed protocol properties are intended to apply even
in a malicious insider scenario.
Note that the protocol is described in a way that seems to imply that
the group of users between which a key is established is always the same.
However, closer examination, e.g. of the discussion following Theorem 3
of section 4, reveals that this is a result of notational assumptions made
to simplify the presentation. To avoid confusion, in the description of the
protocol given below we have generalised the notation slightly to make it
clear that the group can change.
2.2 Related work
The HHMZZ protocol uses a combination of cryptographic hash-functions
and a secret sharing scheme. The use of secret sharing as part of a group key
establishment protocol is long-established (see, for example, section 6.7.2 of
Boyd and Mathuria [1]). However, this approach is known to have short-
comings, [1].
Indeed, the fact that the HHMZZ protocol has serious flaws is hardly
surprising given the unfortunate history of the area. Back in 2010, Harn
and Lin [2] described a group key transfer protocol based on secret sharing
which is not only mathematically flawed, but also possesses very serious
security issues; not only did this give rise to a number of papers pointing
out the flaws (see, for example, [6, 7]), but also further flawed protocols
attempting to ‘fix’ the flaws in the original scheme. Some of the rather sad
history of the area can be found in the recent paper of Liu et al. [5].
2.3 The protocol
The following requirements apply for use of the protocol. Note that we have
made some minor changes to the notation of Hsu et al. [3] for the purposes
of clarity.
• The protocol is designed to work within a set of users U = {Ui}, all
of which must have registered with the KGC (and this KGC must be
trusted by all users to generate and distribute secret keys).
• All participants must agree on a large ‘safe’ prime p and a representa-
tion of the finite field K = Zp of p elements. The participants must also
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agree on two cryptographic hash-functions h1 and h2, both mapping
to K.
• All participants must agree on the function vm : K → K
m+1 defined
by:
vm(x) = (1, x, x
2, . . . , xm)
(where m ≥ 2).
• Every user Ui must:
– have a unique identifier IDi;
– choose a secret key xi ∈ K, which is shared with the KGC.
Now suppose an initiator wishes to arrange for a new secret key to be
shared by the members of a group of users U ′ (U ′ ⊆ U). Suppose U ′ =
{Uz1 , Uz2 , . . . , Uzt} for some t ≥ 2.
The protocol proceeds as follows (where all arithmetic is computed in
K).
1. The initiator sends a key generation request to the KGC along with
the set of t identifiers {IDi : i ∈ U
′}.
2. The KGC broadcasts the set of identifiers {IDi : i ∈ U
′} as a response.
3. Each user Uzj in U
′, i.e. each user Uzj for which IDzj is in the broadcast
set of identifiers, chooses a fresh random challenge rj ∈ K and sends
it to the KGC.
4. The KGC performs the following steps.
(a) The KGC randomly chooses a group key S ∈ K and a value
r0 ∈ K, and assembles the (t+ 1)-tuple r = (r0, r1, r2, . . . , rt).
(b) For every i (1 ≤ i ≤ t) the KGC now computes the inner product
szi = (vt(xzi + h1(xzi ||ri||r0)), r)
where || denotes concatenation of bit strings (and the finite field
values that are concatenated are converted to bit strings using an
agreed representation). The KGC also computes uzi = S − szi .
(c) The KGC now computes the tag Auth as
Auth = h2(S||ID1||ID2|| . . . ||IDt||r0||r1||r2|| . . . ||rt||uz1 ||uz2 || . . . ||uzt)
where, as previously, in assembling the input to h2, elements of
K are converted to bit strings using an agreed representation.
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(d) Finally, the KGC broadcasts
Auth, r0, (uz1 , uz2 , . . . , uzt)
to all members of the group U ′.
5. On receipt of the broadcast, each user Uzi ∈ U
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ t) proceeds
as follows.
(a) Uzi computes
szi = (vt(xzi + h1(xzi ||ri||r0), r))
using its secret key xzi , the random challenges ri (1 ≤ i ≤ t) sent
earlier in the protocol, and the broadcast value r0.
(b) Uzi now computes the group key as S = uzi + szi .
(c) Finally, Uzi verifies the tag Auth by recomputing it using the
newly computed group key and the values sent earlier in the pro-
tocol.
2.4 Two minor observations
In the form that the protocol is specified by Hsu et al. [3], every participating
group member is required to intercept the random challenges rj sent by every
other group member to the KGC. This seems likely to be problematic, at
least in some environments. It would make more sense for the KGC to
broadcast the values (r1, r2, . . . , rt) to all group members in step 4d of the
protocol.
It would appear that the computation xzi +h1(xzi ||ri||r0) is intended to
be a one-way function of the three field elements xzi , ri and r0. However,
if h1 is chosen appropriately, precisely the same property can be achieved
without the addition, i.e. simply by computing h1(xzi ||ri||r0).
2.5 Security claims
Hsu et al. [3] (see Theorem 1 of section 4) make the following claims re-
garding the security of the protocol. They state: ‘The proposed protocol
achieves the security features1 with key freshness, key confidentiality and
key authentication’. In the ‘proof’ of Theorem 1, the following statements
are made.
Key authentication is provided through the value Auth in step
4. . . . Any insider also cannot forge a group key without being
detected since the group key is a function of each member’s long-
term secret xi.
As we show below, this claim is incorrect; that is, an insider can forge a
group key.
1In fact, the paper refers to ‘security feathers’, but this is presumably a misprint.
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3 Analysis
We now describe a serious security vulnerability in the protocol.
3.1 Attack goal and model
We consider the scenario where a ‘victim user’ Uv is a member of a group
U ′ of t users for which a new key is requested. We make the following
assumptions.
• One of the users, Um say, in the group U
′ is malicious.
• Um can control the channel between the KGC and the victim user Uv.
In fact Um only needs to be able to modify the content of what Uv
receives in the final broadcast from the KGC sent in step 4d.
• Um wishes to make Uv accept a key S
∗ of the malicious user’s choice.
3.2 Attack operation
The attack is very simple to describe. We suppose that the protocol proceeds
as described in section 2.3, where Uv, Um ∈ U
′.
In step 4d, Um intervenes and prevents the broadcast from the KGC
reaching Uv. Because the malicious user is a valid member of U
′, Um can
calculate the secret key S generated and distributed by the KGC. Um now
chooses a different secret key S∗ ∈ K, and computes
u∗v = uv − S + S
∗
and
Auth∗ = h2(S
∗||ID1 . . . ||IDt||r0||r1|| . . . ||rt||u1|| . . . ||uv−1||u
∗
v||uv+1|| . . . ||ut).
That is, Auth∗ is computed using exactly the same inputs as Auth except
that S and uv are changed to S
∗ and u∗v.
Um now sends a modified version of the KGC’s broadcast to Uv, where
Auth and uv are replaced by Auth
∗ and u∗v. It is straightforward to see that
the victim user Uv will compute the secret key as S
∗, and the tag Auth∗ will
verify correctly. The attack is complete.
4 Conclusions
As demonstrated above, the HHMZZ protocol fails to possess the properties
claimed of it. This means that the protocol should not be used. It is
important to observe that Hsu et al. [3] do not provide a rigorous security
proof using state of the art ‘provable security’ techniques, nor do they give
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a formal model of security for the protocol. This helps to explain why
fundamental flaws exist. Indeed, the following observation, made by Liu et
al. [5] with respect to a number of previously proposed but flawed group key
establishment protocols, is highly relevant.
The security proof for each vulnerable GKD protocol only relies
on incomplete or informal arguments. It can be expected that
they would suffer from attacks.
It would, of course, be tempting to try to repair the protocol to address
the issues identified, but, unless a version can be devised with an accompa-
nying security proof, there is a strong chance that flaws will remain.
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